The Federal Death Tax and How to Live with It by Garland, Joseph D. & Garrity, James L.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 30 




The Federal Death Tax and How to Live with It 
Joseph D. Garland 
James L. Garrity 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Garland, Joseph D. and Garrity, James L. (1955) "The Federal Death Tax and How to Live with It," St. John's 
Law Review: Vol. 30 : No. 1 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
VOLUME XXX DECEMBER, 1955 NUMBER 1
THE FEDERAL DEATH TAX AND HOW TO
LIVE WITH IT
JOSEPH D. GARLAND t
JAMES L. GARITY
T HIS article is designed to explore the federal estate tax, to
explain it, without oversimplifying, and to afford a
medium for comment on some of the more important changes
made by Congress in its revision of the tax structure of the
country by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. While the
authors hope that this article will be of value to the experi-
enced practitioner in the federal estate tax field, it is not
primarily aimed at him but rather at the student and the
general practitioner who may have been somewhat baffled by
the often cumbersome language of the statute. While some
of this cumbersomeness has historical justification and is
necessary because of troublesome court decisions during the
long existence of the federal estate tax, unfortunately it is
frequently the source of confusion.
THE NATURE OF THE TAX
The federal estate tax has been construed to be an excise
tax.' While the term, excise tax, has in popular usage been
f Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
J Instructor in Taxation, Seton Hall University School of Law.
'New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921); Heitsch v.
Kavanagh, 200 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953);
cf. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929) (gift tax).
4. 30!i Ktam rui
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
restricted to the almost infinite variety of taxes on admis-
sions, occupations, and so forth,2 such a characterization of
the estate tax is not only apt but of the utmost significance.
For an excise tax is a tax on the doing of something,3 and
the something done which is the subject of the estate tax is
the transfer 4 of property at death or under such circum-
stances that the transfer amounts, in substance, to a disposi-
tion at death. An appreciation of this basic concept will
strip some of the mystery from the estate tax. For the stat-
ute is merely a device to spell out, with certain exceptions
dictated by one consideration or another, the types of trans-
fers which are testamentary by nature. The problem of the
measure of the tax then becomes merely a question, although
often an intricate one, of the value of the property so
transferred.
THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The current federal estate tax provisions are set out
under Chapter 11 of the 1954 Code (Sections numbered 2001-
2056, 2101-2106, and 2201-2207). Although much of the 1939
Code has been left essentially unaltered, some substantive
changes in the law have been made. In addition, all the sec-
tions have been renumbered and, to some extent, rewritten.5
Chapter 11 is divided into three subchapters. The basic
provisions of the estate tax grouped under Subchapter A,
"Estates of Citizens or Residents," will be discussed in
this article. Subchapter B, "Estates of Nonresidents Not
Citizens," and Subchapter C, "Miscellaneous," are not dis-
cussed since they are of relatively narrow significance.
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 (Subtitles D and E).
3 See note 1 szpra.
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2001 (imposes a tax on the "transfer" of the
taxable estate).
5 The most pleasant aspect of the new Code for anyone who has confusedly
wandered through the intricacies of Section 811 of the 1939 Code, is the fact
that thirteen separately numbered sections have replaced that single section.




Except where noted, the provisions of the 1954 Code are
applicable to the estates of decedents dying after August 16,
1954.6
The basic pattern of the federal estate tax can be illus-
trated somewhat as follows:
(a) What is included and excluded-the
gross estate (§§ 2031-2044)
minus (b) Exemption ($60,000) (§2052)
minus (c) Deductions (§§2053-2056)
equals (d) The taxable estate (§ 2051)
times (e) The tax rate (§ 2001)
equals (f) The estate tax
minus (g) Credits (§§2011-2016)
equals (h) The amount payable
Thus: a- b-- c =d
dXe f
f- g =h
(a) WHAT GoEs IN-THn GROSS ESTATE
SEcTIONS 2031-2044
While Section 2031 is entitled "Definition of Gross
Estate" it really does not define anything. Section 2031 was
derived from the first sentence of Section 811 of the 1939 Code
and served as a general introductory provision for the spe-
cific statutory enumeration of what constituted the gross
estate contained in that section. As an introductory provi-
sion it served a useful purpose, but standing alone in the new
Code under the heading "Definition of Gross Estate" it is not
only confusing and misleading but also out of place. Since
the only point it adds to the other sections dealing with the
gross estate is that the property included in the gross estate
will be valued at its date of death value, it really is a valu-
ation provision and will be discussed hereafter when that
6 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 7851(a) (2) (A).
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subject is treated. It would seem more logical first to dis-
cover what property is includible in the gross estate and only
then to determine the value of such includible property.
Thus, there is no comprehensive definition of the term
"gross estate" contained in the new Code. In order to dis-
cover what property transfers are includible in the gross es-
tate, it is necessary to adopt a section by section approach to
the problem and consider Sections 2033 to 2044 inclusive.
Property Ouned by the Decedent at the Time of
Death-Section 2033
Section 2033 replaces Section 811(a) of the 1939 Code
without substantial change. The regulation (Reg. 105,
§ 81.13) and rulings promulgated under the corresponding
section of the 1939 Code are of substantial force and effect
in the interpretation of this provision and the court decisions
are undoubtedly binding. Hereinafter, a description of a
section in the 1954 Code as "substantially unchanged" from
its predecessor in the 1939 Code will indicate that the regu-
lations, rulings and court decisions under the old provision
retain their vitality. The applicable regulation will be in-
dicated in parentheses.
Section 2033 subjects property owned by the decedent
at his death to the estate tax. In the ordinary situation most
estates will be taxed almost entirely under this provision.
The section extends to all property of every kind and descrip-
tion, except real property located outside the United States,7
in which the decedent had an interest, to the extent that he
owned the interest, at the time of his death.8 This problem
of ownership is governed by state law 9 and is twofold: did
IPersonal property wherever located is taxable. Guaranty Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 79 F2d 245 (2d Cir. 1935). The exception for foreign real
estate is apparently based on the old common-law principle that the country in
which real estate is located has exclusive control over it and, accordingly, the
exclusive power to tax its transfer. Cf. 31 Ops. ATry GEN. 287 (1918). The
newer principle, that this same exclusive dominion extends to tangible personal
property permanently located within a state's borders [Frick v. Pennsylvania,
268 U.S. 473 (1925)], is applicable to the states, but has not been extended to
the international sphere. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, supra.
8 Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942).
9 Sharp v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 624 (1938), reversing per curiam, 91 F.2d
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the decedent have an interest at death 10 and, if so, could he
transfer it at death? " Vested remainders, 12 possibilities of
reverter, 1 3 accrued income,1 4 and claims of the decedent 15
are examples of property interests which must be included
in the gross estate. However, interests of the decedent, cre-
ated by persons other than himself,16 which terminate upon
his death, such as life estates 1 and remainders contingent
upon survival,' 8 are not includible since such interests are
extinguished by the decedent's death and, in any case, are not
transferred by the decedent, because they cannot be.
Comment: Many property interests owned by the dece-
dent at the time of his death which could be logically included
in the gross estate by virtue of the very general language of
Section 2033 are also includible under the more specific pro-
visions of other sections. These other sections, however, gen-
erally provide that the entire value of the property subject
to certain types of interests is includible, while Section 2033
would only include the value of the interest. It is to be noted
that Congress made no attempt to extend the scope of this
section to include situations where the only interest of the
decedent lies in economic control over, or a "bundle of rights"
in the property which would require the inclusion of the in-
804 (3d Cir. 1937); Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F2d 759 (3d Cir.
1944).
10 Of course, interests such as those of a trustee are not sufficient to come
within the scope of Section 2033. Reed v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 867 (5th Cir.
1930). In any event, such an interest would not ordinarily be transferable at
death.
" See Commissioner v. Rosser, 64 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1933).
12 Frazer's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1947).
"SEstate of Sallie Houston Henry, 4 T.C. 423 (1944), aff'd, 161 F.2d 574
(3d Cir. 1947). If the possibility of reverter lapses with the transferor-
decedent's death, it will not be includible under Section 2033. Rev. Rul. 438,
1955 INT. Ray. BuLL. No. 27, at 31. In some cases the retention of a possibility
of reverter might subject the entire property to the tax under Section 2037 of
the 1954 Code.
"4 Estate of G. Percy McGlue, 41 B.T.A. 1199 (1940). As to income accru-
ing after death, compare Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935), zlith
McClennen v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1942).
15 Parrott v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 792 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S.
870 (1929).
16 If such interests were created by the decedent they may be taxable under
the provisions of Sections 2036-2042 of the 1954 Code.
'7 Frew v. Bowers, 12 F2d 625 (2( Cir. 1926).
18 Commissioner v. Rosser, 64 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1933).
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come from the property in the decedent's income under the
Clifford doctrine. 19
Transactions in Contemplation of Death-Section 2035
Section 2035 replaces Section 811(c) (1) (A) and Sec-
tion 811(1) of the 1939 Code without substantial change
(Reg. 105, § 81.16).
While it is readily apparent that property owned by the
decedent at his death is and should be included in his gross
estate, it is not so clear that, in addition, property which the
decedent had under certain circumstances validly and effec-
tively transferred during life, should also be included in the
estate. However, certain inter vivos transfers are by nature
so testamentary in character and substance-although not
testamentary in the common-law property sense-that there
is no sufficient reason for treating the transfers any differ-
ently than transfers by will or intestacy for the purposes of
the application of an intensely practical federal estate tax,
which strives for equality and fairness between taxpayers
similarly situated.
The most common illustration of an inter vivos transfer
which is the subject of the estate tax is the transfer in con-
templation of death. In general, a gift in contemplation of
death is a transfer which has as its impelling cause the
thought of death rather than motives associated with life.20
Such transfers should not be confused with the revocable gifts
causa mortis of local property law which are sometimes re-
ferred to as gifts in contemplation of death. There is an en-
tirely distinct characterization of that term for federal estate
tax purposes and, while the definition includes common-law
causa mortis gifts, its scope is far more inclusive.2' The most
frequently advanced criteria for determining the motive of
the transfer, whether thought of life or thought of death,22
19Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). The Government's attempt
to include such property in the gross estate under Section 811(a) of the 1939
Code, the predecessor of Section 2033, was frustrated in Helvering v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942). Sections 671-678 of the 1954 Code
constitute codification of the Clifford doctrine for income tax purposes.20 See United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
21 Ibid.
22 Cf. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594 (1945).
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are the age of the donor,23 his physical condition, 24 his plans
for the future,25 and the nature of the property, whether pro-
ductive or unproductive.26  By special legislative pronounce-
ment, gifts made more than three years prior to death, even
though made in contemplation of death, are excluded from
the application of the statute. On the other hand, gifts made
within three years of death are rebuttably presumed to have
been made in contemplation of death.2 7
Comment: Section 2035 represents a fine illustration of
the convenient union of two related provisions which were
widely separated in the 1939 Code. It is interesting to note
that, for no apparent reason, the title of the section has been
changed from "Transfers in Contemplation of Death" to
"Transactions in Contemplation of Death."
Transfers With a Retained Life Estate or a Retained
Right to Govern Enjoyment-Section 2036
Section 2036 replaces Section 811(c) (1) (B) of the 1939
Code without substantial change (Reg. 105, § 81.16).
This section illustrates the second form of transfer dur-
ing life which subjects the property previously transferred
to the estate tax. If the decedent made an effective inter vivos
disposition of property but retained, for a period which is in
effect his own life, the possession, enjoyment or income from
the property, 28 or the right either alone or with any other
person to designate the persons who should possess or enjoy
the property or receive the income therefrom,29 the value of
23 See, e.g., Updike v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 807 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
301 U.S. 708 (1937).
24 See, e.g., Percy B. Eckhart, 33 B.T.A. 426 (1935).
25 See, e.g., Wishard v. United States, 143 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1944).
26 See, e.g., Reeves' Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 829 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 813 (1950). But see Aaron's Estate v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d
314 (3d Cir. 1955).
27 A conclusive presumption that gifts made within two years of death were
made in contemplation of death has been held unconstitutional. See Heiner v.
Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932). Since the determination of the Commissioner
already enjoys a presumption of correctness, it is not clear what the effect is
of this additional specific presumption.
28 For example, D transfers property in trust to X, as trustee, to pay the
income from the property to D for his life and then to distribute the corpus
to Y or his heirs.
29 For example, D transfers property in trust to X, as trustee, to pay the
1955]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the property so transferred is included in his gross estate.
This type of transfer is regarded for estate tax purposes as
transferring nothing during life since the decedent has main-
tained until death either the financial benefit of the property
or the right to control the property. The transferee, in sub-
stance, does not receive anything until the intervening life
estate or the right of control is extinguished by the death of
the decedent. Transfers of this type are includible only if
they were made after March 3, 1931, for Section 2036(b)
continues in effect the rule of May v. Heiner -o which ex-
empted such transfers under the estate tax law existing at
the time.
Comment: There is much overlap between the provi-
sions of this section dealing with the retention of the right
during the transferor's life to control the possession or injoy-
ment of property or to designate the recipients of the income
therefrom, and Section 2038 which deals with the taxability
of transfers with the power to change enjoyment retained. 31
Transfers prior to May 4, 1931 with a retained life estate may
constitutionally be subject to the estate tax because Commis-
sioner v. Estate of Church 32 overruled May v. Heiner.
Transfers Not Completely Effective Until
Death-Section 2037
Section 2037 replaces Section 811(c) (1) (C), Section
811 (c) (2) and (3) with two substantial changes. Reg. 105,
§ 81.17 may be partially effective, particularly subdivision (c)
which would appear to be applicable regardless of the date
of the transfer.
income as D may direct during his life and at D's death to distribute the corpus
to Y or his heirs.
30281 U.S. 238 (1930). While the principle that a transfer with a life
estate retained does not constitute an essentially testamentary disposition is gen-
erally referred to as the doctrine of May v. Heiner, it was not until three de-
cisions were rendered by the Supreme Court, per curiam, on March 2, 1931
[Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931); Morsman v. Burnet, 283
U.S. 783 (1931) ; McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931)] that this prin-
ciple became apparent. Within thirty-six hours Congress overruled these de-
cisions. 46 STAT. 1516 (1931) (Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931).3' See, e.g., Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F2d 142 (1st Cir.
1947).
32 335 U.S. 632 (1949). The Technical Changes Act § 7(b), 63 STAT. 895
(1949), overruled the Church decision.
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Another form of inter vivos transfer which will be con-
sidered essentially testamentary in nature for purposes of
the estate tax is the transfer under which the transferor re-
tains such an interest, or string, in the property transferred
that effective possession or enjoyment of the property, as de-
fined by Section 2037, is not realized until the death of the
transferor. 33
For Section 2037 to be operative two conditions must be
met. In the first place, the decedent, D, must have trans-
ferred an interest in his property to another, X, under such
circumstances that X can possess or enjoy the property under
the interest transferred only if he survives D. For example,
this requirement would be met if D transferred property to A
for life and then back to D, if living, and, if not, to X, since
X must survive D in order to obtain the property. This re-
quirement would not be met, however, if D transferred prop-
erty to A for life and then to X, if living, and, if not, back to
D, since X is not required to survive D in order to take, for
both X and D could be alive at the death of A and still X
would obtain the property.3 4  The second condition which
must be met before Section 2037 becomes operative is that the
decedent must have reserved some interest in the property
under which the property itself (not merely the income from
the property) or control over its disposition may be returned
to him, and this interest must have a value, immediately be-
fore the decedent's death, of more than 5% of the property
transferred. In other words, the transferor must have better
than one chance in twenty of getting the property back.
The following illustration will serve to demonstrate the
fulfillment of both conditions contained in Section 2037. A
young wife, W, transferred property in trust, providing for
the payment of income to her elderly husband, H, during his
life and at his death for the payment of the corpus to her, if
living, and, if not, to X. Two consequences may flow from
33 The statutory predecessors of Section 2037 have had a tumultuous history
in the courts. See, e.g., Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701
(1949); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940); Helvering v. St. Louis
Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935) (overruled by the Hallock case, supra) ; Klein
v. United States, 283 U.S. 231 (1931).
34 Commissioner v. Marshall's Estate, 203 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1953).
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this transfer. First, if W survives H, she gets the property
back and the whole transaction has no estate tax effect be-
cause the property will be included in her gross estate as
property owned by her at her death under the provisions of
Section 2033, discussed above. On the other hand, if W pre-
deceases H, the value of X's remainder interest will be in-
cludible in W's gross estate, that is, the entire value of the
property transferred, less H's remaining life estate. Since
H's life estate was indefeasibly vested by the original trans-
action, whatever value it still has at the time of W's death
should be deducted from the value of the property previously
transferred. W chose to make a transfer from which one of
two possible consequences could flow, depending upon the
time of her death. Since the eventuation of the first conse-
quence would subject the entire property to inclusion in her
gross estate, it seems logical also to include the property, if,
in the alternative, the second consequence results. Because
of the age and sex differential between W and H, it is clear
that the value of W's reversionary interest is more than 5%
of the value of the property immediately prior to W's death;
she had a better than twenty to one chance of getting the
property back.
Under Section 811(c) (3) of the 1939 Code, enacted fol-
lowing the decision of the Supreme Court in Estate of Spiegel
v. Commissioner 5 and applicable to transfers made after
October 7, 1949, a condition of survivorship alone, the first
condition discussed above, was enough to subject the property
to the estate tax even though the transferor retained no re-
versionary interest.3 6 Moreover, this section of the 1939 Code
provided for the inclusion of property in the gross estate if
it were transferred under such circumstances that possession
or enjoyment could be obtained under two or more alterna-
35 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
36 For example, if D transferred property in trust, to pay the income to A
for D's life and at D's death to pay the corpus to C or C's heirs, the property
was includible in D's estate. The rejection of this as the sole test in the 1954
Code reinstates the rule of Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339(1929).
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tives, one of which was outliving the transferor, and the
transferor died before any other alternative materialized. 37
The new Code provision does not substantially change
the law previously applicable to transfers made on or before
October 7, 1949, and, with one exception, makes the law ap-
plicable to transfers made after such date the same as that
applying to the earlier transfers. For transfers made prior
to October 8, 1949, the requisite reversionary interest must
arise by the express terms of the instrument in order for the
property to be includible, while for transfers made after
October 7, 1949, the property will be subject to tax even if
the reversionary interest arose merely by operation of law.
Comment: The two changes made in the new Code are
highly commendable. If the decedent had previously parted
with all his interest in the property, that is, had retained no
reversionary interest of any kind in it, there does not seem
to be any reason for including the property in his gross estate
simply because his death marked the time for the shifting of
interests in the property. Moreover, if, in fact, survivorship
was not required for possession of the property, there seems
to be no reason for taxing the property simply because the
transferor dies before the other circumstance eventuates. On
the other hand, a literal reading of the present statute,
"possession . . . can . . . be obtained only by surviving the
decedent" (emphasis added), would exclude situations where
possession can be obtained under either of two alternatives,
one of which is survivorship and the other of which is unreal
(for example, on January 1, 2055 or on transferor's death,
whichever first occurs). It can be anticipated that the Com-
missioner and the courts will have no difficulty with such a
device. 38
It is to be noted that if the transferor's reversionary in-
terest is not more than 5% of the value of the property, that
is, he has only one chance in twenty or less of getting the
property back, the value of the chance would be includible
37For example, if D transferred property to X until Y reached 30 or D died,
and then to Y, the value of the property would have been includible in D's
gross estate in the event that D died before Y reached 30.
38 Cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17 (1939), as amended, T.D. 6078,
1954-2 Cum. BULL. 286 (last sentence of first paragraph in subdivision (c)).
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under Section 2033. However, if the value of the reversionary
interest is more than 5% of the value of the property (for
example, he has one chance in nineteen) the entire value of
the property is includible under Section 2037.39 This is an
example of line-drawing which leads to more or less arbitrary
results.
Transfers With the Power to Change Enjoyment
Retained-Section 2038
Section 2038 replaces Section 811(d) of the 1939 Code
without any substantial change (Reg. 105, § 81.20).
Still another type of inter vivos transfer which will sub-
ject the property so transferred to the estate tax is the trans-
fer wherein the transferor reserved in himself alone, or in
himself and any other person, the right to alter, amend, re-
voke or terminate the enjoyment of the property transferred
and this right was retained until the date of decedent's death
or was released in contemplation of death. 40 In the case of
transfers made on or before June 22, 1936, this power to
amend, and so forth, must have been derived from a right
reserved at the time of transfer, while in the case of transfers
after that date a power in the grantor regardless of its source
will result in includibility.41 The reservation of a power to
change the enjoyment of property is the retention of a sub-
stantial string. In some cases, the transferor would hold as
much power over the donees as one who had made no transfer
would hold over the persons who expected or hoped to be re-
membered in his will. No donee can be certain what he is
getting until this power of alteration is extinguished and, if
death causes the extinguishment, there is every reason in logic
and justice to include the property in the gross estate. The
courts have broadly interpreted this provision and included
in the gross estate property which was transferred subject
39 This principle is discussed under the Commentr regarding Section 2033.
40 The test as to what constitutes a release in contemplation of death is the
same as the one applicable to transfers in contemplation of death generally,
and the three-year presumptions are the same. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954,
§ 2035(b).
41 White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98 (1935).
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only to a power in the donor to terminate the trust and ac-
celerate the remainders which were already vested.42
Comment: Since the only difference between transfers
made on or before June 22, 1936 and those made after that
date is the source of the power to change enjoyment, there
seems to be little justification for two separate complete sub-
paragraphs based on this date and for differences in phrase-




Section 2039 is completely new. It clarifies existing case
law and rulings, for example, Rev. Rul. 158, 1953-2 Cum.
BULL. 259 and Rev. Rul. 260, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 262.
Under the 1939 Code and prior Revenue Acts the value
of an annuity, receivable by reason of surviving a decedent
who was a joint annuitant or the primary annuitant and who
had contributed the purchase price or a portion thereof of
the annuity, was includible in the decedent's gross estate
either as a transfer with a reserved life estate under the pred-
ecessors of Section 2036,11 or as a transfer not effective until
death under the predecessors of Section 2037 45 or in some
cases, as a transfer with the power to change enjoyment re-
tained under the predecessors of Section 2038.46
Section 2039 of the 1954 Code for the first time in the
federal revenue laws makes explicit provision for the estate
taxation of annuities. Probably in recognition of the prin-
ciple founded on May v. Heiner,4" dealing with transfers with
a retained life estate made before March 4, 1931, discussed
above under Section 2036, the annuity provision is applicable
only to annuity contracts entered into on or after that date.
Under this section, the value of a survivor's interest under
42 Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
43See Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946) ; U.S. Treas.
Reg. 105, § 81.20(a) (1939), as amended, T.D. 6073, 1954-2 Cum. BuL 280.
'4Mearkle's Estate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1942); cf.
Commissioner v. Twogood's Estate, 194 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952).4 5 Rev. Rul. 260, 1953-2 Cum. BuLr. 262.
46 Ibid.
47281 U.S. 238 (1930).
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the decedent's annuity is includible in the decedent's gross
estate in proportion to the decedent's contribution to the total
purchase price. For example, if a husband were to pay three-
quarters of the cost of a joint annuity for himself and his
wife, and someone else, not necessarily the wife, were to pay
the other one-quarter, three-quarters of the value of the wife's
right to receive the annuity 48 would be includible in the hus-
band's gross estate. If the annuity arises from the decedent's
employment, the payments made by the employer are re-
garded as payments by the decedent unless the annuity is
receivable under an employees' trust which meets the require-
ment for qualification under Section 401 (a) of the new Code,
or under a plan which meets the non-discriminatory provi-
sions of Section 401 (a) (3) of the new law. In the case of
such trusts or plans only the amounts contributed by the de-
cedent are regarded as made by him and the employer's con-
tributions are treated as contributed by someone other than
the decedent. While generally the annuity provisions are
applicable only to decedents dying after August 16, 1954, the
provision dealing with the non-attribution to the decedent of
contributions for annuities by an employer to a qualified trust
or a non-discriminatory plan is applicable to decedents dying
after December 31, 1953, the effective date of the new income
tax provisions dealing with annuities.
49
Comment: The question arises as to whether annuity
contracts executed prior to March 4, 1931, which are ex-
plicitly excluded from the operation of Section 2039, will
continue to be governed by the other provisions of the estate
tax law, specifically, as transfers effective at death or as
transfers with a power to revoke, as they were before the
enactment of this special annuity section. Similarly, ques-
tions are bound to arise as to what constitutes a payment by
a decedent, particularly since this new section does not use
the phrase "paid directly or indirectly" which was contained
in Section 811 (g) of the 1939 Code, dealing with the payment
48 Under prior law there was considerable confusion concerning the valuation
of the surviving annuitant's rights. Compare Mearkle's Estate v. Commissioner,
supra note 44, with Estate of William J. Higgs, 12 T.C. 280 (1949), rev'd M1
other grounds, 184 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1950).49 INT. t V. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2039(c), 7851(a) (1) (A).
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of premiums on life insurance.50 This section offers a further
example of the discrimination in favor of employees who are
fortunate enough to work for an employer who establishes a
qualified employees' trust. In such a case, the employee does
not pay income tax on the contributions of the employer and
at death the value of the annuity attributable to the contribu-
tions of the employer will be excluded from the gross estate.
On the other hand, if the employee is not covered by such a
trust, he will have to pay income tax on the income he re-
ceives and uses to purchase an annuity and his gross estate
will be increased by the value of the annuity attributable to
these payments.
Insurance-Section 2042
Section 2042 replaces Section 811(g) of the 1939 Code
with a substantial change. However, Reg. 105, §§ 81.25,
81.26, 81.28 and parts of 81.27 would appear to be still
applicable.
Insurance proceeds that are payable to a decedent's es-
tate are included in the gross estate.51 However, insurance
proceeds payable to other beneficiaries are includible only if
the decedent possessed an incident of ownership in the policy
at his death. Incidents of ownership include the power to
change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to
assign it, to pledge it for a loan and so forth.52 An incident
of ownership also includes a reversionary interest arising ex-
pressly or by operation of law, which might include a pos-
sibility that the proceeds would be payable to decedent's
estate,5 3 if the value of such interest exceeds 5% of the value
50 Cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.27 (1939), as amended, T.D. 6073,
1954-2 Cum. BULL. 280.
51 Insurance proceeds payable to the estate were held taxable under the
predecessor of Section 2033 [Mimnaugh v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 411 (1928),
cert. denied, 280 U.S. 563 (1929)] prior to enactment of the predecessor of
Section 2042.
52 See Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 853 (1950) ; Bailey v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 644, 31 F. Supp. 778,
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 721 (1940); U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.27(c) (1939),
as amended, T.D. 6073, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 280.
53 Cf. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2037; Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S.
687 (1945).
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of the policy immediately before the decedent's death. 4
While the statute does not specifically so provide, it is prob-
able that the transfer of an incident of ownership in contem-
plation of death under Section 2035 would subject the pro-
ceeds of life insurance to tax by virtue of this latter section.55
Under Section 811(g) of the 1939 Code, insurance proceeds
were also includible in the gross estate, in an amount pro-
portionate to the percentage of premiums paid directly or
indirectly by the decedent after January 10, 1941, even
though the decedent retained no incident of ownership. The
new Code abolished this premium payment test.5 6
Comment: Insurance proceeds are by nature testamen-
tary.5 7 Even though one may own no incident of ownership
on a policy on his own life, when he pays premiums he is
thinking of providing a fund at his death for the beneficiary
of the policy. This fund constitutes the greater economic
value of the policy and usually is the predominant reason for
making the payments. It would not seem illogical to argue
that the payment of premiums constitutes a transfer that is
not completely effective until death.58 On the other hand,
as pointed out by the Senate Finance Committee,59 no other
property is subject to the estate tax when the decedent long
before death has divested himself of all incidents of ownership
in it. The new provision eliminates the troublesome require-
ment of determining what payments were made indirectly by
the decedent. Insofar as any reversionary interest is con-
cerned, the insured can prevent any such interest from aris-
ing in his favor by operation of law by assigning all rever-
sionary interests to a tax-exempt organization.
In revising the estate tax law, Congress made no effort
to clarify the complex problem of what constitutes insur-
54 Bank of New York v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. N.Y. 1953);
Ford v. Kavanaugh, 108 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
55 Cf. May Billings, 35 B.T.A. 1147 (1937); U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 8125
(1939), as amended, T.D. 5239, 1943-1 Cum. BuLr. 1081.
56 This direct or indirect test has been the source of controversy. See, e.g.,
Estate of Albert Dudley Saunders, 14 T.C. 534 (1950).
57 Garrett's Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F2d 955 (2d Cir. 1950).
58 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. B14 (1954) (Minority views
of the House Ways and Means Committee).
59 See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954).
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ance.60 The draftsmen might well have placed this section
closer to the provision dealing with annuities. With the elim-
ination of the premium payment test, the problem arises as
to whether premium payments made within three years of
death are transfers in contemplation of death and includible
under Section 2035.
Joint Interests-Section 2040
Section 2040 replaces Section 811 (e) of the 1939 Code
without any substantial change (Reg. 105, § 81.22). This
section provides that all property held by the decedent in
joint tenancy or in tenancy by the entirety shall be included
in his gross estate except to the extent that the survivor can
show that the property originally belonged to him or can
show consideration in money or money's worth.6 1  If the
property was originally received as a gift or inheritance from
a third party by two tenants as joint tenants, only one-half
of the value of the property will be includible in the dece-
dent's gross estate. The same principle applies if there are
more than two tenants. It should be noted that this section
does not apply to tenancies in common, which interests are
taxable under Section 2033.
Comment: The establishment of a joint tenancy by a
person is another example of a transfer wherein the trans-
feror retains a substantial string on the property which is
not broken until death. It seems clear that property held in
such tenancy should be subject to the estate tax in accordance
with the provisions of Section 2040 and the survivor should
bear the burden of tracing the consideration for the prop-
erty.6 2 Section 2515 provides that the creation of a tenancy
by the entirety in real property by one of the spouses will not
give rise to the gift tax unless the parties so elect. A hard-
ship, in regard to the basis to the survivor of property orig-
60 See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941); Commissioner v.
Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950) ; Estate
of John C. Morrow, 19 T.C. 1068 (1953).
61 See Harvey v. United States, 185 F2d 463 (7th Cir. 1950).
62 See Estate of Joseph H. Heidt, 8 T.C. 969 (1947), aff'd per curiain, 170
F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1948).
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inally held in joint tenancy existing under prior law,6 3 has
been eliminated by Section 1014(b) (9) of the 1954: Code
which provides that the property shall have the date of de-
cedent's death value to the extent it was included in his gross
estate, rather than the value of the property as of the creation
of the tenancy.
Powers of Appointment-Section 2041
Section 2041 replaces Section 811(f) of the 1939 Code
without substantial change (Reg. 105, § 81.24). If a dece-
dent dies with power to designate the persons who shall re-
ceive property, he has at death substantial power over that
property even if he were not the transferor of that property.6 4
Congress has, however, refrained from exercising its full es-
tate taxing rights over the possessor of such a power 65 and
has restricted the tax on property subject to a power of ap-
pointment to relatively narrow grounds. In the first place,
the tax is applicable only if the power is one that is termed
a "general power," with a single exception in the case of a
power creating a new power which postpones vesting. A
"general power" is defined as including only a power that is
exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors,
or the creditors of his estate. However, a power to invade
under a reasonable standard for invasion will not be con-
strued as enabling the possessor of the power to appoint it to
himself. In addition, in the case of a power created prior to
October 22, 1942, the power will not be considered a general
power if it is exercisable only in connection with another per-
son and, in the case of a power created after October 21, 1942,
it will not be considered a general power if it is exercisable
only in connection with the creator of the power or with some-
one having a substantially adverse interest in the property.
63 See Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 109 (1933).
64 Powers of appointment should be distinguished from situations where the
transferor of the property in question retained an interest or power therein
under Sections 2036-2038.
65 Section 403 of the Revenue Act of 1942 extensively revised Section 811 (f)
of the 1939 Code and provided for much broader taxation of powers of ap-
pointment. The scope of the section was considerably narrowed by Section 2
of the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951 which is the basis for Section 2041
of the 1954 Code.
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Once it is established that the power is a "general power"
under these tests, still a further inquiry is necessary to de-
termine whether the property subject to the power is in-
cludible in the gross estate. In the case of a power created
before October 22, 1942, the general power must be exercised
by will or by a disposition 66 (not including a complete
release) that is essentially testamentary in nature, such as
where the decedent retains a substantial string on the power
until death. In the case of a general power created after
October 21, 1942, mere possession of such a power at the time
of death or the release of it under testamentary circumstances
within the meaning of Sections 2035-2038 is enough to require
the inclusion of the property subject to the power within the
gross estate. The statute also contains further limitations
dealing with the partial release of certain general powers 67
and the lapse of others.6 8
Comment: The narrowing of what constitutes a taxable
power of appointment has resulted in an unnecessarily com-
plicated statutory provision. This reflects the intention of
Congress to permit flexibility in property dispositions where
the creator of the power is in no position to estimate the
future needs of the beneficiaries. However, it also enables a
decedent to transmit property from one generation to another
without incurring any estate tax liability."
Dower and Curtesy-Section 2034
Section 2034 replaces Section 811(b) without substantial
change (Reg. 105, § 81.14). This section includes within the
gross estate the value of the interest of a surviving spouse,
such as dower, curtesy or the statutory substitute therefor.70
This section was originally considered necessary in order to
avoid the effect of decisions 71 which held, under state tax
66 Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410 (1943); cf. Helvering
v. Grinnell, 294 U.S. 153 (1935).
67 INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(a) (1).
68 Id. § 2041 (b) (2).
69 For example, D to A for life and at A's death as he shall appoint by will
under a special power.
70 E.g., N.Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 18.
71 See, e.g., Matter of Starbuck, 137 App. Div. 866, 122 N.Y. Supp. 584 (2d
Dep't 1910), aff'd inem., 201 N.Y. 531, 94 N.E. 1098 (1911).
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laws, that property received by the surviving spouse by
dower, curtesy or the like was not includible because such
interest does not pass from the decedent but arises by opera-
tion of law.
Comment: This section does not provide for the in-
clusion in the gross estate of property which would not be
otherwise includible. Rather it has the negative effect of
precluding the exclusion of property because of technical
common-law property rules. For this section to be operative,
the decedent must have at the time of his death an interest
in the property which would be includible in his estate under
one of the other sections pertaining to gross estate.7 2  The
draftsmen of the Code might well have placed this section
adjacent to Section 2043 due to the fact that these sections
are overlapping to some extent.73
Transfers for Insufficient Consideration-ection 2043
Section 2043 (a) replaces Section 811 (i) of the 1939 Code
without substantial change (Reg. 105, § 8115) and Section
2043 (b) replaces a small portion of Section 811(b) without
substantial change (Reg. 105, § 8129).
If property or an interest in property is transferred as a
result of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth, that property or that interest
is not includible in the gross estate even though the circum-
stances under which the sale took place might, under a literal
reading of Sections 2035-2038 or Section 2041, constitute the
transfer a testamentary disposition. 74 This provision is abso-
lutely sound, because, under the hypothesis of a bona fide sale,
the amount of the decedent's property which will be includible
in the gross estate is not decreased, but one form of property
merely takes the place of another.
If, however, the property or the interest in property was
transferred for some consideration in money or money's
worth, but the full value of the property or interest was not
72 Estate of Harry E. Byram, 9 T.C. 1 (1947).
73 See Empire Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1938).
74 Mary E. McDonald, 2 B.T.A. 1295 (1925).
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received, there is no reason for excluding from the gross es-
tate the excess of what was given over what was received.
Accordingly, Section 2043 (a) provides that, in the latter case,
the fair market value at the time of decedent's death of the
property transferred under testamentary circumstances is in-
cludible in the gross estate, less the value of the consideration
received by the decedent. In order to constitute a bona fide
sale the transfer must have been made in good faith, and the
price received must have been an adequate and full equivalent
reducible to a money value for the property transferred.7 5
Property transferred to obtain the relinquishment of
dower, curtesy, the statutory estate created in lieu thereof or
of other marital rights in the decedent's property furnishes
the consideration for common-law contracts. As demon-
strated above, however, Section 2034 provides that these mari-
tal interests of a surviving spouse shall be includible in the
decedent's gross estate. Accordingly, it would be an anomaly
to require the inclusion of a dower interest of a surviving
spouse, while at the same time exempting property trans-
ferred under circumstances essentially testamentary in na-
ture to the spouse under contracts supported by the consid-
eration of the relinquishment of this same right.76 Thus,
Section 2043 (b) provides that the relinquishment of such
marital rights will not be considered consideration in money
or money's worth.
Comment: It has been well established that the relin-
quishment of support rights by a spouse or child is not one
of the other "marital rights" referred to in this section.7 7 In
addition, a decree of separation or divorce which incorporates
an agreement requiring the decedent to transfer property to
his spouse in satisfaction of rights of dower, curtesy or the
statutory equivalent has been found to furnish full considera-
tion for the transfer, the court refusing to look through the
75 U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.15 (1939), as amended, T.D. 6016, 1953-1 Cum.
BuL. 391. See also U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.8 (1940) (gift tax regulation);
Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
'7 See Empire Trust Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 73.
77E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. BuLu. 166.
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transaction to its basic source.78  On the other hand, if the
agreement is operative outside of the court decree, the usual
rule applies.7 9  It must be noted that under Section 2516 of
the gift tax law such agreements need no longer be dependent
upon a court decree in order to furnish consideration in
money's worth for purposes of that tax, provided a decree of
divorce is entered within two years of such agreement. There
is a question as to whether this provision will be absorbed
into Section 2043(b).
Valuation of Property Included in the Gross
Estate-Section 2031
Section 2031 replaces the first sentence of Section
811(a) without substantial change (Reg. 105, §§ 81.10, 81.12,
81.28) .80
The property includible in the gross estate is, with the
exception provided in Section 2032, discussed below, valued at
the date of decedent's death. This provision is applicable not
only to property owned in possession and enjoyment by the
decedent at his death which is taxable under Section 2033,
but also to all property required to be included under Sec-
tions 2035-2043.
The problem arises as to what is the date-of-death value
of the property. The value used is the "fair market value"
which is defined as "the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell." 81
Often, however, property and interests in property have no
ready marketability and, therefore, special methods have been
set up to approximate this fair market value.8 2
7s Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946). A similar result
has been reached under the gift tax. See Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106
(1950).
79 Bank of New York v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
80 See text Comment dealing with the gross estate generally (Sections
2031-2044).
81U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.10(a) (1939), as amended, T.D. 5906,
1952-1 Cum. BuLL. 155.
82 For example, the fair market value of a future interest is calculated
under Mortality Tables set out in U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.10(i) (1939), as
amended, T.D. 5906, 1952-1 Cum. BuLL. 155. The factors to be considered in
valuing shares of stock of closely held corporations have been set out in Rev.
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Comment: As noted above, Section 2031 is misplaced
and misnamed. In addition, there appears to be no justifi-
cation for the existence of Section 2031 (b) which deals with
one aspect of the problem of valuing one type of property,
unlisted stocks and securities. Since so many factors are in-
volved in valuing such stocks and securities, 83 it is unfortu-
nate that the statute is cluttered by one, the sales price of
comparable securities on exchanges, which is certainly of
relatively small applicability.
Alternative Valuation-Section 2032
Section 2032 replaces Section 811(j) of the 1939 Code
without substantial change (Reg. 105, § 81.11).
Since the value of property may drop sharply in the
process of administration, as happened in many cases as an
aftermath of the depression of 1929, the decedent's executor
is given the election to value the property as of the date of
death or one year later. The executor has up until the time
of filing the estate tax return to make the decision most favor-
able to the estate. If the election is made to use the optional
valuation date, it applies to all property includible in the
gross estate except property sold or disposed of prior to the
optional valuation date, which is valued as of the date of
sale or other disposition. However, values of interests which
are affected by mere lapse of time, such as terms for years, 4
are not reduced simply because of the passage of the year.
Of course, if property is valued at a date one year after death,
deductions must also be so valued, with safeguards to prevent
a double deduction in the case of losses to property between
the date of death and the alternate valuation day.
Comment: While there is an improvement in placing
this section, Section 811(j) of the 1939 Code, closer to Sec-
tion 2031, Section 811(a) of the 1939 Code, it would have
Rul. 77, 1954-1 Cum. BuL 187. The valuation of life insurance policies pay-
able to third parties presents complex problems treated specially by U.S. Treas.
Reg. 105, § 81.28 (1939).
83 See Rev. Rul. 77, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 187.
84 See Estate of John A. Hance, 18 T.C. 499 (1952).
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been an even greater improvement if a separate valuation
subdivision had been provided.
Prior Interests-Section 2044
Section 2044 replaces Section 811(h) of the 1939 Code
without substantial change. No regulations were promul-
gated under Section 811(h).
This section provides that, except where otherwise spe-
cifically provided, the estate tax shall apply to transfers, and
so forth, whenever made.
Comment: Since every other section has a specific effec-
tive date or is obviously applicable for everyone living as of
the effective date of the new Code, the retention of this sec-
tion appears unjustified. The Internal Revenue Service so
lightly regarded its predecessor that no regulations were ever
issued under it.
(d) WHAT IS THE TAXABLE ESTATE-(a) (THE
GIoSS ESTATE) MiNus (b) (EXEMPTION) AND
(c) (DEDUCTIONS) -SECTIONS 2051-2056
Tawable Estate-Section 2051
Section 2051 replaces the first sentence of Section 812 of
the 1939 Code without substantial change (Reg. 105, § 81.4).
The taxable estate equals the value of the decedent's
gross estate, less the total amount of authorized deductions,
including a specific exemption. The estate tax return need
not be filed unless the value of the gross estate exceeds
$60,000. 85 Of course, there will be no taxable estate unless
the gross estate exceeds the authorized deductions.
Comment: The term "taxable estate" is used in place
of, and as a clarification of, the term "net estate" of the 1939
Code. This is consistent with the use of "taxable income"
rather than "net income" in Section 63 (a) of the income tax
sections.




Section 2052 replaces Sections 812 (a) and 935 (c) of the
1939 Code with a substantial change. However, Reg. 105,
§ 81.48 may be partially effective.
A specific exemption of $60,000 is first deducted from the
gross estate when determining the taxable estate.
Comment: There is no longer an exemption in the
amount of $100,000 applicable against the basic estate tax,
that tax having been eliminated as pointed out under Section
2001 below. But every decedent still obtains a 60,000 de-
duction just for dying.
Expenses, Debts and Taxes-Section 2053
Section 2053 replaces Section 812(b) of the 1939 Code
with substantial changes. However, Reg. 105, §§ 81.29 to
81.40 would appear to be still applicable for the most part.
Amounts actually expended for funeral expenses,8 6 rea-
sonable administration expenses, 7 settlement of bona fide
claims enforceable against the estate existing at time of de-
cedent's death 88 and in satisfaction of the full unpaid amount
of mortgages on property includible in the gross estate 89 may
be deducted provided their payment is authorized by the
laws of the jurisdiction under which the estate is being
administered.90
86 Commissioner v. Cardeza's Estate, 173 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1949).
87 Reasonable administration expenses include executor's commissions,
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Pa.
1954) ; trustee's commissions, Sharpe's Estate v. Commissioner, 148 F2d 179
(3d Cir. 1945) ; attorney's fees, Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. United States,
54 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Pa. 1944); taxes, Thompson v. United States, 8 F.2d
175 (D. Minn. 1925) ; and miscellaneous costs and fees for maintaining and/or
selling decedent's property, Haggart's Estate v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 514
(3d Cir. 1950).
88 To be deductible, such claims must be supported by adequate consideration
in money or money's worth. Irving Trust Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 303
(2d Cir. 1955) ; Commissioner v. Estate of Swink, 155 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1946).
89 Parrott v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 792 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S.
870 (1929).
90 If the state court has actually passed on the merits of the deduction in a
bona fide litigation, its finding is binding on the Commissioner. Goodwin's
Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953).
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For the most part, it will no longer be necessary to dis-
tinguish between decedent's probate estate, namely his prop-
erty subject to claims, and decedent's gross estate, namely
all his property including that not subject to claims (for
example, life insurance payable to beneficiaries other than the
estate). Claims against the estate are deductible even though
such claims exceed the value of the probate estate if such
claims are paid prior to the time for filing of the estate tax
return.91 Moreover, administration expenses incurred in con-
nection with property included in the gross estate, but not
included in the probate estate, are deductible if such expenses
are paid prior to expiration of the period of limitations for
assessment of the estate tax.92
Comment: The amendments with respect to deductions
for claims and expenses incurred in connection with property
not included in the probate estate are fairly designed to ex-
tend the scope of deductions to embrace expenses attributable
to property included in the gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes. These expenses, as well as losses allowed under
Section 2054, below, are not deductible if they have been
claimed as a deduction in an income tax return. In order to
claim them for income tax purposes, a waiver of the right to
take them as estate tax deductions must be filed.9 3
Losses-Section 2054
Section 2054 replaces Section 812(b) of the 1939 Code
without substantial change (Reg. 105, § 81.39).
A deduction may be taken for uncompensated losses to
undistributed assets of the estate, incurred during settlement
of the estate, arising from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other
casualties as from theft.
Comment: Should the alternative valuation date be
elected as provided in Section 2032, such losses are not de-
ductible if they are incurred before such date and the amount
of the losses is reflected in a lower valuation of the property.
91 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6075 (a).
92 Id. § 6501.




Section 2055 replaces Section 812(d) of the 1939 Code
without substantial change (Reg. 105, §§ 81.44-81.47).
Deductions are allowed for all bequests and devises to,
or for, public, religious, charitable,94 scientific, literary and
educational uses. 96 The amount of such deductions may not
exceed the value of the property transferred as included in
the gross estate and is permitted for any portion of the estate
which goes to the charity because of an irrevocable disclaimer
filed prior to the filing of the estate tax return by another
beneficiary who otherwise would receive an interest in the
same property.9 6 Complete termination of a power to ap-
propriate property for the benefit of an individual beneficiary,
such as by the beneficiary's death, prior to the exercise of
such power now constitutes such a disclaimer.
Comment: If a life beneficiary who has been given a
power to use trust principal dies within a short time of de-
cedent's death, the deduction is now allowable even though
the beneficiary signed no written document disclaiming his
power, so long as the remainder goes to a charity.
Marital Deduction-Section 2056
Section 2056 replaces Section 812(e) of the 1939 Code
without substantial change (Reg. 105, § 81.47(a) to (e)).
A deduction up to 50% of the value of decedent's
"adjusted gross estate" 97 is permitted for interests in prop-
94 No deduction is permitted for a conditional bequest to a charity where
there is no assurance that the charity will receive the bequest. Commissioner
v. Sternberger's Estate, 348 U.S. 187 (1955).
95 Section 2055 (a) (4) provides for a deduction for bequests and devises to
certain veterans' organizations.
Il Commissioner v. Macaulay's Estate, 150 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1945).
11 The "adjusted gross estate" is defined in Section 2056(c) (2) (A) as
equalling the gross estate minus deductions for expenses, debts and taxes al-
lowed under Section 2053 and the deduction for losses allowed under Section
2054. Thus the maximum marital deduction is computed without regard to
the $60,000 specific exemption under Section 2052, or to charitable deductions
under Section 2055. For example, a man with a gross estate less expenses and
losses equal to $180,000 may leave $30,000 to a charity and $90,000 to his wife
without incurring any federal estate tax; the $60,000 exemption remaining to
apply to any other devises and bequests he might make.
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erty belonging to the decedent "passing" 9s to decedent's sur-
viving spouse provided such interests are not considered
"terminable," 99 or, if terminable, the equivalent of a taxable
general power over such interest is also passed to the sur-
viving spouse. 00
Two additional types of terminable interests which, when
coupled with a general power of appointment, will qualify
for this deduction have been formulated by the 1954 Code:
(a) A transfer to the surviving spouse of a legal life
estate, together with a general power of appointment over
the property, qualifies for the deduction. 101
(b) A transfer of an interest in an undivided portion of
property to the surviving spouse qualifies for the deduction
if the surviving spouse has the right to income from a specific
portion of the transferred property and a general power of
appointment over that portion.10 2
Comment: In an effort to equalize federal estate taxes
between decedents who died as residents of community prop-
erty states and those who died as residents of non-community
9s "Passing" includes property transferred to the surviving spouse as the
result of joint tenancy, the exercise of a power of appointment, dower or
curtesy, insurance and the like. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a(b) (1949),
as amended, T.D. 6082, 1954-2 CuM. BuLL. 295; see Rev. Rul. 83, 1953-1 Cum.
BuL. 395.
09 A surviving spouse receives an interest in property which is "terminable"
(a) if such interest will terminate and (b) if another interest in the same
property has passed from decedent to a third person (c) who may enjoy the
property after termination of the surviving spouse's interest. INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, §2056(b) (1). For example, D transfers a life estate in property to S,
his surviving spouse, remainder to his children living at S's death.
100 If property is left in trust for a surviving spouse, the deduction is not
lost if the spouse is entitled to the income of the trust annually and has a
taxable general power of appointment over the corpus. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2056(b) (5). If proceeds of life insurance are payable in installments to the
surviving spouse, or the interest from the proceeds is so payable annually, the
deduction is not lost if the spouse has the right to designate to whom the re-
maining installments shall be paid. Id. § 2056(b) (6).
101 Since Section 812(e) (1) (F) of the 1939 Code spoke in terms of a "trust,"
the Commissioner had successfully taken the position that a legal life estate,
subject to a general power, did not qualify as an exception to the "terminable"
interest rule. Estate of Edward F. Pipe, 23 T.C. 99 (1954) ; Estate of Michael
Melamid, 22 T.C. 966 (1954).
102 Under Section 812 (e) (1) (F) of the 1939 Code, all income of the trust
had to be receivable by the surviving spouse and her general power also had
to embrace the entire trust. Estate of Harrison P. Shedd, 23 T.C. 41 (1954);
Rev. Rul. 20, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 195.
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property states, the marital deduction section was enacted in
1948,103 bringing into the Code one of its most complicated, 1°4
yet most useful, provisions. It is designed to extend to non-
community property states the tax advantage of treating up
to one-half of the deceased spouse's property as already be-
longing to the surviving spouse, to the extent that a deceased
spouse is willing to put his property in the same status as it
would be in a community property state.105 Thus, the deduc-
tion, the equivalent to estate splitting, cannot exceed 50% of
the decedent's adjusted gross estate, since no more than one-
half of the dead spouse's estate belongs to the survivor in a
community property state. Inasmuch as the surviving spouse
in a community property state owns outright one-half of the
community property, the marital deduction may be taken only
with respect to fee interests, or their equivalent, passing to
the surviving spouse in non-community property states. This
requirement has been expressed in the Code by providing that
the deductions may not be taken for terminable interests in
property passing to the surviving spouse unless such spouse
receives a general power over the property-the equivalent of
virtual ownership.108
If the interest passing to the surviving spouse is encum-
bered, the encumbrance must be taken into account in deter-
mining the value of the interest transferred. Moreover, al-
lowance must be made for the effect of any local inheritance
tax upon the interest passing to the surviving spouse.1 07 The
changes made in the marital deduction provisions by the 1954
Code are perfectly in accord with the basic purpose of the
section as outlined above and overrule two highly technical
restrictions of the 1939 Code.
103 Revenue Act of 1948, § 361, 62 STAT. 117 (1948).
104 Even the term "spouse" has led to litigation. A wife retains her status
as spouse until an interlocutory divorce decree becomes final. Marriner S.
Eccles, 19 T.C. 1049, aff'd imer., 208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953).
103 See S. REP. No. 1013 (Part 2), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) (Report of
the Senate Finance Committee), 1948-1 Cum. BULL. 331.
106 See Estate of Frank E. Tingley, 22 T.C. 402 (1954); Rev. Rul. 121,
1954-1 CuM. BuLL. 196.
107 Cf. Estate of Rosalie Cahn Morrison, 24 T.C. No. 109 (1955).
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(f) WHAT IS THE ESTATE TAX? (f) = (d) (THE TAXABLE
ESTATE) TIMES (e) (THE TAX RATE) -SECTIONS 2001-2002
Rate of Tax-Section 2001
Section 2001 replaces Sections 810 and 935 of the 1939
Code with substantial change. However, Reg. 105, § 81.7 may
be partially effective.
A single estate tax schedule with rates progressing from
3% to 77% is applied to the taxable estate computed above.
Comment: By combining into a single schedule the two
separate tax schedules of the 1939 Code it is no longer neces-
sary to compute a "tentative tax," a "basic tax" and an "addi-
tional estate tax." Despite this long overdue simplification,
there has been no change in effective tax rates.
Liability for Payment-Section 2002
Section 2002 replaces Section 822(b) of the 1939 Code
without substantial change (Reg. 105, §§ 81.76 and 81.99).
The estate tax is payable in full fifteen months after de-
cedent's death and is to be paid by decedent's executor, who
is personally liable therefor.108 Any person in actual or con-
structive possession of property of the decedent is deemed an
executor in the absence of formal administration. 10 9
(h) WHAT IS THE AMOUNT PAYABLE? (h) = (f) (THE ES-
TATE TAX) MINUS (g) (THE CREDITS)-SECTIONS 2011-2016
Credit for State Death Taxes-Section 2011
Section 2011 replaces Section 813(b) of the 1939 Code.
However, Reg. 105, § 81.9 may be partially effective.
A credit against the amount of federal estate tax com-
puted above is allowed for death taxes actually paid to a
state. No credit is granted unless the taxable estate exceeds
$40,000. The amount of such credit is limited by a table set
08 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2204 makes provision for discharge of the
executor from personal liability upon compliance with the provisions.1 09 Id. § 2203.
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out in Section 2011(b) to 80% of the former "basic tax."
That is, the former 80% limit is applied to a hypothetical
tax computed under the former basic rates using the former
exemption.
Comment: To preserve the existing credit for state
death taxes, the combination of the two former federal estate
taxes in a single rate schedule has created the need for a
special schedule in this section in order to determine the
credit.
Credit for Gift Tax-Section 2012
Section 2012 replaces Sections 813(a) (2) and 936(b)
of the 1939 Code without substantial change (Reg. 105,
§ 81.8).
As pointed out above in the discussion of what consti-
tutes the gross estate, it may happen that property validly
transferred inter vivos by the decedent is also included in his
gross estate because of the character of the transfer. In order
to minimize the hardship resulting from the imposition of
two taxes, the estate and the gift, on the same transfer, a
credit against the estate tax is allowed for federal gift taxes
paid on property includible in the gross estate. The credit
will be allowed regardless of when the gift tax was paid. The
amount of the credit shall not exceed either the actual gift
tax paid on the property,110 or an amount computed under
the following ratio:
X (Credit) Value of Gift 11
D's Estate Tax Value of Gross Estate (less char-
itable and marital deductions)
Comment: The new Code justifiably extends the avail-
ability of the credit to gift taxes paid under the Revenue Act
of 1924.
110 Adjusted for "gift splitting" provision available to spouses. Id. § 2513.
""Value at the time of gift or death, whichever is lower, reduced by the
amount of gift tax exclusion, estate tax marital deduction and estate tax char-
itable deduction attributable to the property.
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Credit for Tax on Prior Transfers-Section 2013
Section 2013 completely replaces Section 812(c) of the
1939 Code. Reg. 105, § 81.41 will no longer be applicable.
It may happen that the decedent's estate includes prop-
erty transferred from the estate of another decedent and that
an estate tax was imposed on this transfer to him. In order
to minimize the hardship resulting from the imposition of
multiple estate taxes on closely related transfers of the same
property, a credit is allowed based upon the value of property
included in another gross estate which incurred federal estate
taxes upon the transfer of such property within ten years
prior to, or two years following, decedent's death.
The amount of the credit can never exceed the amount
of tax attributable to the property in the decedent's estate.112
Moreover, the amount of credit is limited to the portion of
the estate tax on the other decedent's estate borne by the
property transferred to the decedent:
X (Credit) Value of such property 114
Other decedent's estate Total taxable estate of
tax 113 other decedent - death
taxes ± $60,000
The amount of credit as computed above is taken in full
where the decedent dies within two years of the other dece-
dent's death and is decreased in the amount of 20% for every
additional two years separating the deaths.
Comment: This section provides for a credit for other
estate taxes paid on the transfer of the same property, rather
than a deduction for the value of the property itself as under
prior law. Since the basic policy behind the former provision
was to avoid multiple estate taxation, this change brings the
112 In determining this figure, adjustment must be made to reflect the portion
of the charitable deduction attributable to the property.
113 Amount prior to reduction for gift tax credit and credit for tax on prior
transfer.
114 Value in other decedent's estate, less death taxes, encumbrances and any
marital deduction attributable to the property.
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effectuation of this policy in line with other provisions hav-
ing a similar policy, such as the credit for state, foreign and
gift taxes. It is not applicable with respect to property sub-
jected to federal gift taxes as was its 1939 predecessor.115
However, it extends the credit to transfers subsequent to de-
cedent's death as long as the other decedent's death takes
place within two years. In addition, the credit is allowable
even if the other decedent received the benefit of a similar
credit under this section. Its complicated provisions clear
up the problem of how the value of the property on which the
credit is based is to be determined. 1 6
Credit for Foreign Tao -Section 2014
Section 2014 replaces Sections 813 (c) and 936 (c) of the
1939 Code without substantial change.
A credit against the federal estate tax is allowed for
death taxes paid to a foreign country on property includible
in decedent's gross estate.
Credit for Death Taces on Remainders-Section 2015
Section 2015 replaces Section 927 of the 1939 Code with-
out substantial change (Reg. 105, § 81.79).
Where a credit under Sections 2011 or 2014 is attribu-
table to a reversionary or remainder interest and an election
is made to postpone the tax on such interest under Section
6163 (a) until termination of the prior estate, the credit may
be claimed at the time of termination of such estate.
Recovery of Taxes Claimed as Credit-Section 2016
Section 2016 replaces Section 874(d) (3) of the 1939
Code without substantial change.
If decedent's estate recovers any of the taxes paid to
states or foreign countries for which credits have been taken
against the federal estate tax under Sections 2011 and 2014,
1 1 5 INT. IRV. CODE OF 1939, § 812(c).
16 See Estate of Anna C. Yantes, 21 T.C. 830 (1954), aff'd per curiam, 220
F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1955).
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the executor shall pay any additional tax due upon recompu-
tation of the tax. No interest shall be collected on any
amount of tax due except to the extent a foreign country
paid interest on the refund of tax.
WHEN IS THE AMOUNT PAYABLE DUE?
The estate tax return shall be filed within fifteen months
after the date of decedent's death, n1 and the full amount of
tax is due at that time.
CONCLUSION
In the main, the provisions of the federal estate tax ac-
complish their objective of reaching transfers at death and
their equivalent. The most glaring exception is contained in
the favored treatment afforded life insurance. In areas such
as this, changes and modifications are to be anticipated.
117 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6075 (a).
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